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environment affected the democratization process in these emerging states? Now that democratic institutions have been selected, how will this domestic regime choice affect their foreign policies?
International relations (IR) theory offers little help in answering these questions. While IR theorists have addressed the foreign policies of great powers, they have largely ignored the study of small states. Moreover, even when scholars do refer to weak states, systemic rather than domestic factors are accorded causal primacy. The received wisdom in the field is that domestic determinants will be less salient when studying small state behaviour because external constraints are more severe and the international situation is more compelling. Including domestic affairs in our analysis would only detract from an already satisfactory explanation based on the small state's position in the international system and its interaction with the great powers.
Given this scholarly consensus, small state foreign policy provides a unique opportunity for those scholars who insist that domestic politics matters in explaining international and foreign-policy outcomes. Put more formally, weak state foreign policy presents a crucial test for domestic level theory. It is precisely in such cases where the conventional wisdom suggests that international factors can adequately account for state policy. If we can show that domestic politics matters even in these instances where we would expect that it should not, then we will have provided the strongest possible support for domestic level theorizing.
This article is divided into three sections. In Section i, I review the received wisdom in the field which assumes that neorealism has the home-court advantage in explaining small state behaviour.2 Assertions that international 2 Neorealism assumes that interniational constraints influence state behaviour. In general, international pressures will override domestic interests, internal political struggles, and the characteristics of particular states in foreign-policy decision making. Given that the international system is anarchic and that states must consequently ensure their own security, the exigencies of the international environment will be paramount in decision makers' calculations. Accordingly, a state's behaviour is viewed as a response to the constraints and incentives of its aggregate power relative to others (i.e., the distribution of capabilities) or the degree of aggressive intent on the part of external actors (i.e., the balance of threat). Neorealists assume that statesmen will respond rationally to these preconditions and will choose that foreign-policy course which is most likely to maximize security benefits and minimize security risks. While neorealists recognize that systemic/structural factors may prevent statesmen from pursuing optimal strategies, it is presumed that elites are domestically unconstrained. In contrast to this structural/systemic argument, unit or domestic level theories expect that state attributes and societal conflicts will affect foreign-policy choices. It is assumed that foreign policy will not always reflect national security interests or systemic/structural imperatives. Rather, the characteristics of particular states and the ideologies and local interests of societal and state actors will often render statesmen incapable of responding to the exigencies of the international environment. International relations (IR) theory offers little help in answering these questions. While IR theorists have addressed the foreign policies of great powers, they have largely ignored the study of small states. Moreover, even when scholars do refer to weak states, systemic rather than domestic factors are accorded causal primacy. The received wisdom in the field is that domestic determinants will be less salient when studying small state behaviour because external constraints are more severe and the international situation is more compelling. Including domestic affairs in our analysis would only detract from an already satisfactory explanation based on the small state's position in the international system and its interaction with the great powers.
This article is divided into three sections. In Section i, I review the received wisdom in the field which assumes that neorealism has the home-court advantage in explaining small state behaviour.2 Assertions that international factors have causal priority in such cases are not uncommon. In fact, most students view small state behaviour as a function of either the international distribution of power or the balance of threat. Changes in small state foreign policies are considered isomorphic to fluctuations in the structure of the international system and/or the degree of threat posed by the great powers. In light of this scholarly consensus, small state foreign policy poses a hard case for domestic level theory while it is easy on alternative systemic/structural explanations. Thus a successful refutation of the received wisdom would pose an even more significant challenge to neorealism in other contexts -it would do much to legitimize domestic level approaches while seriously diminishing neorealism's claim for explanatory primacy in the study of international relations.3
In Section ni, various domestic level theories of foreign policy are rejected in favour of an 'institutional' approach. Historical institutionalism suggests that we study the development of domestic rules and structures separately from their effects over time. This two-stage research strategy is necessary because the variables that are important for explaining institutional formation and change may be less important in accounting for subsequent state behaviour. For example, while international factors play a dominant role in predisposing statesmen towards particular democratic institutional alternatives, subsequent state practices may reflect these recent domestic institutional choices rather than the constraints of the international environment. Paradoxically, neorealism has greater explanatory power in accounting for domestic regime choice in emerging states than it does for explaining their subsequent military strategies.
In Section inl, I review pre-1900 US domestic regime change and subsequent military strategy. American state building in the 1780s provides an opportunity for testing how the international environment influences the choice between alternative democratic institutional arrangements, if at all. The historical evidence suggests that systemic/structural conditions play a dominant role in democratic institutional formation and change. When emerging states are faced with severe external threats to their survival, regime reformers are more likely to choose presidential institutional features. When such exogenous pressures are absent, statesmen enjoy a wider range of alternatives. They may choose presidential type systems, but parliamentary institutions may also appear attractive.
US foreign security policy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries also provides a ready testbed for judging the merits of a domestic politics alternative to the study of small state behaviour. Specifically, I identify the determinants of military strategy during the Quasi War (1798-1800); the War of 1812; and the Mexican-American War (1846-48).4 Each case pits neorealism against the proposed domestic level argument. Since the two theories lead us to expect different foreign policies, I examine the actual outcomes to see which theory predicts more reliably. The domestic institutional argument gains credibility by providing the best explanation for US military strategies. The defeat of neorealism in this competition can be considered particularly significant because the theory fails in an area in which it claims to be strong.
The cases demonstrate how the rules and structures of presidentialism, rather than the constraints of the external environment, influenced US military strategies. The historical evidence suggests that US foreign policies during this period failed to reflect prevailing international conditions and can only be understood from a domestic level perspective. Specifically, domestic institutional features affected both the timing and substance of US military strategies. Systemic/structural factors lead us to expect foreign-policy behaviour which is not borne out by the empirical evidence. The proposed domestic level approach provides a closer historical fit.
In conclusion, the article suggests that the kinds of causal arguments appropriate for explaining state choices during periods of crisis when domestic institutions are first created, may be less appropriate in later periods -while the external environment affects domestic institutional development, these institutional designs will condition subsequent foreign policy outcomes. Neorealism assumes that such domestic'regime type has only a limited affect on a state's foreign policy, if at all.5 According to neorealism, domestic politics can be 4 Military strategy is how states decide 'which wars shall be fought, or if war should be fought' (see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 285). These cases comprise the three foreign wars that the United States fought as a weak state as well as the security issues which dominated domestic debate during the initial years of the American republic.
5 It is often argued that while neorealism can account for general recurring patterns of state behaviour, it does not attempt to explain the foreign policies of specific states. For example, Waltz says that a theory of foreign policy is required in order to explain how an individual state will respond to the constraints posed by the international system (see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 71-2). Nevertheless, Waltz does derive different foreign polices, such as alignment strategies, from different distributions of power. Balancing, chain-ganging, and buckpassing behaviour, which Waltz depicts as the product of the system and its given polarity, are not general systemic or international outcomes but are rather alternative foreign-policy strategies. In short, neorealism is a theory of foreign policy. But it differs from other theories of foreign policy by assuming that state behaviour will be responsive to international constraints and incentives rather than domestic level pressures. For additional studies absent, statesmen enjoy a wider range of alternatives. They may choose presidential type systems, but parliamentary institutions may also appear attractive. US foreign security policy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries also provides a ready testbed for judging the merits of a domestic politics alternative to the study of small state behaviour. Specifically, I identify the determinants of military strategy during the Quasi War (1798-1800); the War of 1812; and the Mexican-American War (1846-48).4 Each case pits neorealism against the proposed domestic level argument. Since the two theories lead us to expect different foreign policies, I examine the actual outcomes to see which theory predicts more reliably. The domestic institutional argument gains credibility by providing the best explanation for US military strategies. The defeat of neorealism in this competition can be considered particularly significant because the theory fails in an area in which it claims to be strong.
In conclusion, the article suggests that the kinds of causal arguments appropriate for explaining state choices during periods of crisis when domestic institutions are first created, may be less appropriate in later periods -while the external environment affects domestic institutional development, these institutional designs will condition subsequent foreign policy outcomes. Neorealism assumes that such domestic'regime type has only a limited affect on a state's foreign policy, if at all.5 According to neorealism, domestic politics can be 'black boxed', because, whatever their different internal characteristics, all states must nevertheless act in similar ways to ensure their security in a self-help world. Past research on small states has relied on this view of international relations. The scholarly consensus views small state behaviour from a state-centric perspective in which foreign-policy outputs are a response to external constraints. By contrast, I argue that whether international or domestic factors matter more is an empirical question and should not be assumed a priori. In contests between levels of analysis, neither domestic nor international arguments automatically win.
I. HOW SHOULD WE STUDY SMALL STATE FOREIGN POLICY?
The Scholarly Consensus While mainstream IR has largely ignored the study of weak states, scholars have suggested that we can account for their behaviour by focusing on the effects of the international system. The reasoning is as follows: since small states are more preoccupied with survival than are the great powers, the international system will be the most relevant level of analysis for explaining their foreign-policy choices. Because weak states are typically faced with external threats to national survival, foreign policy will reflect an attentiveness to the constraints of the international environment and foreign-policy goals will be less constrained by the domestic political process. By contrast, domestic politics will necessarily play a greater role in an explanation of great power foreign policy. Generally speaking, great powers are faced with a lower level of external threat in comparison to small states and thus have more options for action. This increased range of choice will tend to make foreign policy formation more susceptible to domestic political influences. Consequently, unit level variables cannot be ignored when explaining great power foreign policy." 6 See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 194-5. With regard to the determinants of small state foreign policy, Waltz is ambiguous. On the one hand, he argues that small state security and foreign policy will be dependent on structural constraints, such as the degree of great power competition. Small states will need to be more attentive to these external constraints due to their 'narrower margin for error' (Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 184-5, 195). On the other hand, Waltz claims that the smaller the state, the more it is likely to take international constraints for granted, since nothing it does can significantly effect the international system. Moreover, because great powers focus their attention on those states most likely to present a security threat, they will be less interested in weak states. As a result, small states will face fewer external constraints and their behaviour will be more likely to reflect domestic political influences (Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 72-3).
'black boxed', because, whatever their different internal characteristics, all states must nevertheless act in similar ways to ensure their security in a self-help world. Past research on small states has relied on this view of international relations. The scholarly consensus views small state behaviour from a state-centric perspective in which foreign-policy outputs are a response to external constraints. By contrast, I argue that whether international or domestic factors matter more is an empirical question and should not be assumed a priori. In contests between levels of analysis, neither domestic nor international arguments automatically win.
Arguments that presume the salience of different levels of analysis in the study of great versus small state behaviour have been raised in several seminal texts. Well-known early examples include Wolfers and Rosenau. The former, in his famous analogy of the 'burning house', emphasizes that states' fear for survival is a variable rather than a constant and that 'the closer nations are drawn to the pole of complete compulsion', the more they can be expected to conform in their behaviour and act in a way that corresponds to structural models.7 For Wolfers, the need to analyse decision making and domestic politics is most essential in the study of great power foreign policy, where environmental constraints are less severe and hence differences in state behaviour are more pronounced. Similarly, in assessing the relative explanatory power of structural and domestic factors in foreign policy, Rosenau suggests that the international environment will be more important in an analysis of small state rather than great power foreign policy.8
In recent years, this scholarly consensus has been reinforced. It is generally assumed that because of the different international contexts in which small and large states operate, their foreign policies will reflect different sets of constraints. Domestic level pressures will have more relevance for explaining the foreign-policy choices of states which are less exposed to the international environment. For example, Jervis argues that the security dilemma is particularly acute for small states that cannot afford to be cheated and are less likely to be buffered from the consequences of foreign-policy mistakes. Unlike great powers, small states lack a 'margin of time and error' when responding to external exigencies. Since the costs of being exploited are much higher for small states than they are for great powers, the former will feel the effects of anarchy to a greater extent. Consequently, statesmen in small states will need to be 'more closely attuned' to external constraints than will great power leadership.9
Similarly, Snyder assumes that the study of small state and great power behaviour require different analytical foci. He points out that 'among the great powers, domestic pressures often outweigh international ones in the calculations of national leaders'.'1 Since great powers 'enjoy a substantial buffer from the pressures of international competition', domestic political explanations are good predictors of their foreign policy strategies. When studying the foreign policies of small states, Snyder does not expect domestic political theories to fit as well. Whereas 'great powers adapt their foreign strategies to their domestic Arguments that presume the salience of different levels of analysis in the study of great versus small state behaviour have been raised in several seminal texts. Well-known early examples include Wolfers and Rosenau. The former, in his famous analogy of the 'burning house', emphasizes that states' fear for survival is a variable rather than a constant and that 'the closer nations are drawn to the pole of complete compulsion', the more they can be expected to conform in their behaviour and act in a way that corresponds to structural models.7 For Wolfers, the need to analyse decision making and domestic politics is most essential in the study of great power foreign policy, where environmental constraints are less severe and hence differences in state behaviour are more pronounced. Similarly, in assessing the relative explanatory power of structural and domestic factors in foreign policy, Rosenau suggests that the international environment will be more important in an analysis of small state rather than great power foreign policy.8
Similarly, Snyder assumes that the study of small state and great power behaviour require different analytical foci. He points out that 'among the great powers, domestic pressures often outweigh international ones in the calculations of national leaders'.'1 Since great powers 'enjoy a substantial buffer from the pressures of international competition', domestic political explanations are good predictors of their foreign policy strategies. When studying the foreign policies of small states, Snyder does not expect domestic political theories to fit as well. Whereas 'great powers adapt their foreign strategies to their domestic circumstances', small states are more 'exposed to the vagaries of international security and economic competition'. Since small state foreign policy strategies will reflect an attentiveness to external exigencies, international/structural explanations should suffice."
Like Snyder, Schweller argues that domestic level explanations will be less useful when it comes to small states. According to Schweller, domestic institutional constraints explain why great power democracies have consistently pursued foreign policies short of war when confronted with rising challengers. By contrast, small democratic states 'have not had their foreign policy options constrained by those [domestic politicall elements that have ruled out preventive war for other democracies'.12 Rather than being susceptible to domestic level influences, Schweller concludes that 'extreme systemic constraints' can account for weak state foreign policy and military behaviour.'3 Walt concurs with this received wisdom. In explaining the alliance patterns of small states, he suggests that weak states are more likely to bandwagon with an aggressive great power than balance against it. He attributes this foreign policy strategy to the position of small states in the international system. Since weak states are vulnerable to the aggressive demands of great powers, they will ally with a dominant power in order to avoid immediate attack. Bandwagoning is likely to be a preferred alliance strategy when the threatening great power is geographically proximate and has a strong offensive capacity as well as when alternative great power allies are unavailable.'4 Labs' recent study of small state alignment similarly concludes that systemic-level conditions determine the foreign policies of weak states. Like Walt, Labs argues that whether weak states are more likely to balance or bandwagon against a great power threat is a function of systemic factors, such as geographic proximity and the availability of alternative alliance options.15 He concludes that neorealism is 'powerful in predicting weak state behavior'. 16 Lastly, in their study of state behaviour in the post-cold war era, Goldgeier and McFaul argue that while domestic politics will have an increasing influence on great power foreign policy, the behaviour of small states on the periphery of the international system will continue to reflect structural/systemic constraints: 'structural realism is inadequate to explain the behavior of states in the core but is relevant for understanding regional security systems in the periphery '.7 To what extent has the small state literature reflected the scholarly consensus found in mainstream IR theory? We would expect that those works specifically devoted to the study of small states would question the received wisdom's empirical validity. Yet, 'to a large extent, small states research concentrates its efforts on the level of structurally determined behavior patterns. All authors, to some degree, start from the assumption that the structural attributes of smallness are by far the most important, if not the only, criteria that determined small states' policy'.18
Analysts typically assume that because small states lack the necessary self-sufficiency to defend themselves against great powers, they will be on great power foreign policy, the behaviour of small states on the periphery of the international system will continue to reflect structural/systemic constraints: 'structural realism is inadequate to explain the behavior of states in the core but is relevant for understanding regional security systems in the periphery '.7 To what extent has the small state literature reflected the scholarly consensus found in mainstream IR theory? We would expect that those works specifically devoted to the study of small states would question the received wisdom's empirical validity. Yet, 'to a large extent, small states research concentrates its efforts on the level of structurally determined behavior patterns. All authors, to some degree, start from the assumption that the structural attributes of smallness are by far the most important, if not the only, criteria that determined small states' policy'.18
Analysts typically assume that because small states lack the necessary self-sufficiency to defend themselves against great powers, they will be In sum, mainstream IR theorists in general, and most small state researchers in particular, explain small state foreign policy by focusing on the prevailing features of the international system and on small state-great power interaction. Bjol puts it well: 'For the small state, as Rosenau has pointed out, the environment is a much more important variable than for the great power, and hence any reasoning about its role should probably start by an identification of the type of international system in which it has to operate'.23
Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard
The received wisdom in the field suggests that structural/systemic variables have the home-court advantage in accounting for weak state foreign policies. Given this scholarly consensus, the study of small state behaviour provides a unique opportunity for dealing neorealism a major blow as well as for demonstrating the merits of domestic level approaches to foreign policy analysis. Small state behaviour offers a particularly good test of neorealism because it is a crucial case. According to Stinchcombe, theories gain credibility by being pitted against each other in crucial experiments: 'by eliminating the most likely alternative theory, we increase the credibility of our theory much more than we do by eliminating alternatives at random'.24 Posen claims that 'our goal of theory testing should be the construction of particularly difficult tests -tests that one intuitively expects the theory to pass only with difficulty'.25 Similarly, Grieco notes that 'the most powerful way to test a theory is to In sum, mainstream IR theorists in general, and most small state researchers in particular, explain small state foreign policy by focusing on the prevailing features of the international system and on small state-great power interaction. Bjol puts it well: 'For the small state, as Rosenau has pointed out, the environment is a much more important variable than for the great power, and hence any reasoning about its role should probably start by an identification of the type of international system in which it has to operate'.23
The received wisdom in the field suggests that structural/systemic variables have the home-court advantage in accounting for weak state foreign policies. Given this scholarly consensus, the study of small state behaviour provides a unique opportunity for dealing neorealism a major blow as well as for demonstrating the merits of domestic level approaches to foreign policy analysis. Small state behaviour offers a particularly good test of neorealism because it is a crucial case. According to Stinchcombe, theories gain credibility by being pitted against each other in crucial experiments: 'by eliminating the most likely alternative theory, we increase the credibility of our theory much more than we do by eliminating alternatives at random'.24 Posen claims that 'our goal of theory testing should be the construction of particularly difficult tests -tests that one intuitively expects the theory to pass only with difficulty'.25 Similarly, Grieco notes that 'the most powerful way to test a theory is to determine if the propositions derived from it hold in circumstances in which they are unlikely to do so, and in which comparable but divergent propositions from competing theories very much ought to be validated'.26
Based on this criterion, small state behaviour is essentially a hard case for domestic level theory while it is easy on the alternative neorealist explanation. Since small state behaviour is likely to reflect the constraints of the international environment, it should offer the best confirmation of neorealist assertions. Indeed, neorealism should have little difficulty in explaining small state foreign policy because these cases are precisely where we would expect unit level influences to play a less significant role. Finding that domestic politics does indeed matter in these unlikely instances will challenge the explanatory power of neorealism while justifying the need for domestic level analysis. Lastly, state-centred approaches which view policy outcomes as a function of organizational structure (i.e., the relative strength of the state in relation to society), obscure the role of political bargaining which inevitably occurs in all democratic states, whether 'weak' or 'strong'.30 This 'domestic structure' approach identifies the boundaries within which political choices are made but fails to explain specific foreign-policy formation. Additionally, the domestic structure approach derives outcomes from fairly fixed contextual features. It assumes that political outcomes can simply be 'read off' an institutional configuration.3' Consequently, the domestic political process which necessarily intervenes between state-societal preconditions and foreign-policy outcomes is underspecified.
II. DOMESTIC LEVEL THEORIES OF FOREIGN

The Institutional Approach
Institutionalism, often termed the 'new institutionalism' or 'historical institutionalism', addresses the shortcomings of both societal and statist approaches.32 Indeed, an institutional approach is especially well suited for the study of foreign-policy formation in democratic states, because it attempts to account for the open interplay between state and society and the ways in which institutional designs impinge upon both state and societal actors.33
Central to institutionalism is the belief that factors internal to political 
33
Thelen and Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', p. 10. I define institutions here as sets of rules that prescribe permissible behaviour. Institutions define acceptable patterns of conduct which channel social behaviour in a certain direction rather than in the many directions that would otherwise be possible. executive branch, often neglect the fact that the successful implementation of state policy requires the co-operation of powerful societal groups.29 Moreover, statist approaches commonly fail to take sufficient account of the more subtle forms of public pressure. For example, in democracies, the executive typically has institutional incentives to anticipate the reactions of domestic groups and to revise policies to accord with citizens' expected attitude towards future policies. Thus, while the executive may encounter little domestic opposition, statists are incorrect to infer that this consensus implies executive autonomy from societal forces.
Lastly, state-centred approaches which view policy outcomes as a function of organizational structure (i.e., the relative strength of the state in relation to society), obscure the role of political bargaining which inevitably occurs in all democratic states, whether 'weak' or 'strong'.30 This 'domestic structure' approach identifies the boundaries within which political choices are made but fails to explain specific foreign-policy formation. Additionally, the domestic structure approach derives outcomes from fairly fixed contextual features. It assumes that political outcomes can simply be 'read off' an institutional configuration.3' Consequently, the domestic political process which necessarily intervenes between state-societal preconditions and foreign-policy outcomes is underspecified.
The Institutional Approach
Central to institutionalism is the belief that factors internal to political Moreover, given serious external threats, statesmen will tend to choose domestic institutions on the basis of their likely impact on foreign-policy performance. Since minimizing these international threats and ensuring survival of the polity will be of prime importance, specific domestic rules, structures and decision-making procedures will be fashioned with this goal in mind. Once statesmen have opted for democracy, the choice between various institutional alternatives will be influenced by the perceived effects that these differing systems will have on immediate foreign-policy options. Ceteris paribus, we can expect that when faced with serious exogenous threats and foreign-policy failures, advocates ofdemocratization will be predisposed towards presidential institutional arrangemernts. Unsuccessful foreign policies will discredit claims for a decentralized democratic system, such as parliamentarism, and will legitimize arguments for increased centralization and stronger democratic options. In presidential systems, the executive is separately elected and therefore relatively autonomous from societal forces represented in the legislative branch. Statesmen are likely to assume that such an institutional arrangement will contribute to more efficient foreign policies by enabling the executive branch to base strategy on the national interest rather than on the demands of particularistic groups. In sum, the external environment influences domestic Moreover, given serious external threats, statesmen will tend to choose domestic institutions on the basis of their likely impact on foreign-policy performance. Since minimizing these international threats and ensuring survival of the polity will be of prime importance, specific domestic rules, structures and decision-making procedures will be fashioned with this goal in mind. Once statesmen have opted for democracy, the choice between various institutional alternatives will be influenced by the perceived effects that these differing systems will have on immediate foreign-policy options. Ceteris paribus, we can expect that when faced with serious exogenous threats and foreign-policy failures, advocates ofdemocratization will be predisposed towards presidential institutional arrangemernts. Unsuccessful foreign policies will discredit claims for a decentralized democratic system, such as parliamentarism, and will legitimize arguments for increased centralization and stronger democratic options. In presidential systems, the executive is separately elected and therefore relatively autonomous from societal forces represented in the legislative branch. Statesmen are likely to assume that such an institutional arrangement will contribute to more efficient foreign policies by enabling the executive branch to base strategy on the national interest rather than on the demands of particularistic groups. In sum, the external environment influences domestic claim that 'a democratic regime is installed not by trends but by people',45 there has been little study of how international preconditions affect the interaction between domestic groups. For instance, little attention has been devoted to how international factors, such as the threat of invasion or war, may influence the bargaining game between government and opposition. Moreover, since external preconditions tend to be included in a long list of additional domestic level variables, the independent effect of these international factors on the domestic political process is obscured.46 Lastly, recent studies of democratization fail to recognize that the international context can have a crucial bearing on the type of democratic regime likely to emerge.47 I suggest that international factors are more likely to be linked to domestic regime formation and change when states are faced with severe threats. Specifically, international threats may trigger foreign-policy crises which, in turn, strengthen the bargaining position of regime reformers vis-t-vis status quo proponents. Exogenous pressures can provide a 'window of opportunity' for advocates of regime reform. Reformers can draw attention to external threats and poor foreign-policy performance in order to justify the necessity for regime change and delegitimize the position of those who support the status quo.
Moreover, given serious external threats, statesmen will tend to choose domestic institutions on the basis of their likely impact on foreign-policy performance. Since minimizing these international threats and ensuring survival of the polity will be of prime importance, specific domestic rules, structures and decision-making procedures will be fashioned with this goal in mind. Once statesmen have opted for democracy, the choice between various institutional alternatives will be influenced by the perceived effects that these differing systems will have on immediate foreign-policy options. Ceteris paribus, we can expect that when faced with serious exogenous threats and foreign-policy failures, advocates ofdemocratization will be predisposed towards presidential institutional arrangemernts. Unsuccessful foreign policies will discredit claims for a decentralized democratic system, such as parliamentarism, and will legitimize arguments for increased centralization and stronger democratic options. In presidential systems, the executive is separately elected and therefore relatively autonomous from societal forces represented in the legislative branch. Statesmen are likely to assume that such an institutional arrangement will contribute to more efficient foreign policies by enabling the executive branch to base strategy on the national interest rather than on the demands of particularistic groups. In sum, the external environment influences domestic claim that 'a democratic regime is installed not by trends but by people',45 there has been little study of how international preconditions affect the interaction between domestic groups. For instance, little attention has been devoted to how international factors, such as the threat of invasion or war, may influence the bargaining game between government and opposition. Moreover, since external preconditions tend to be included in a long list of additional domestic level variables, the independent effect of these international factors on the domestic political process is obscured.46 Lastly, recent studies of democratization fail to recognize that the international context can have a crucial bearing on the type of democratic regime likely to emerge.47 I suggest that international factors are more likely to be linked to domestic regime formation and change when states are faced with severe threats. Specifically, international threats may trigger foreign-policy crises which, in turn, strengthen the bargaining position of regime reformers vis-t-vis status quo proponents. Exogenous pressures can provide a 'window of opportunity' for advocates of regime reform. Reformers can draw attention to external threats and poor foreign-policy performance in order to justify the necessity for regime change and delegitimize the position of those who support the status quo.
Moreover, given serious external threats, statesmen will tend to choose domestic institutions on the basis of their likely impact on foreign-policy performance. Since minimizing these international threats and ensuring survival of the polity will be of prime importance, specific domestic rules, structures and decision-making procedures will be fashioned with this goal in mind. Once statesmen have opted for democracy, the choice between various institutional alternatives will be influenced by the perceived effects that these differing systems will have on immediate foreign-policy options. Ceteris paribus, we can expect that when faced with serious exogenous threats and foreign-policy failures, advocates ofdemocratization will be predisposed towards presidential institutional arrangemernts. Unsuccessful foreign policies will discredit claims for a decentralized democratic system, such as parliamentarism, and will legitimize arguments for increased centralization and stronger democratic options. In presidential systems, the executive is separately elected and therefore relatively autonomous from societal forces represented in the legislative branch. Statesmen are likely to assume that such an institutional arrangement will contribute to more efficient foreign policies by enabling the executive branch to base strategy on the national interest rather than on the demands of particularistic groups. In sum, the external environment influences domestic Exogenous threats do not automatically result in domestic regime transition. In most instances domestic institutions will be able to cope with external pressures. At other times, revisions of existing rules and structures can be instituted without a wholesale transformation of the traditional regime. Indeed, international pressures are more likely to generate domestic institutional change in emerging states. Unlike great powers, new states have much more to lose from poor foreign-policy performance and are less likely to survive in the face of severe exogenous threats. Consequently, they will be more likely to adjust domestic institutions to the demands of the international environment and they will have more incentives to tailor internal rules and structures towards achieving greater efficiency in foreign policy. Additionally, systemic/structural factors are more likely to affect the decision-making calculus, because domestic institutions have yet to be consolidated. Since domestic institutions are not yet considered established rules-of-the-game, they will be expendable for more efficient structures. Yet, even when elites in newly independent states realize that existing institutions are inadequate, regime change is not guaranteed. The consolidation of a new set of institutional rules will be dependent on whether bargains, pacts and deals can be successfully concluded. Often this will require the amendment of new institutions such that no group will be likely to attain disproportional benefits.48 Thus, while the specification of international preconditions cannot foretell whether statesmen will produce new institutions, it can nevertheless provide information about what kind of behaviour we can expect from the actors involved.
Domestic Institutional Effects on Foreign Policy
Essential to an institutional approach is the assumption that policy is the product of institutions whose previous historical development can significantly effect the political process in later periods. During transition periods, politics is an 'evolving game of experimentation and adaptation to new historical conditions'. Once institutions are selected, we can begin to see politics in terms of a 'well-ordered game with more or less fixed rules'.49 In Katzenstein's words: 'periods of great crisis can profoundly affect the way domestic politics is organized; periods of relative normality can ... reinforce that pattern of Exogenous threats do not automatically result in domestic regime transition. In most instances domestic institutions will be able to cope with external pressures. At other times, revisions of existing rules and structures can be instituted without a wholesale transformation of the traditional regime. Indeed, international pressures are more likely to generate domestic institutional change in emerging states. Unlike great powers, new states have much more to lose from poor foreign-policy performance and are less likely to survive in the face of severe exogenous threats. Consequently, they will be more likely to adjust domestic institutions to the demands of the international environment and they will have more incentives to tailor internal rules and structures towards achieving greater efficiency in foreign policy. Additionally, systemic/structural factors are more likely to affect the decision-making calculus, because domestic institutions have yet to be consolidated. Since domestic institutions are not yet considered established rules-of-the-game, they will be expendable for more efficient structures. Yet, even when elites in newly independent states realize that existing institutions are inadequate, regime change is not guaranteed. The consolidation of a new set of institutional rules will be dependent on whether bargains, pacts and deals can be successfully concluded. Often this will require the amendment of new institutions such that no group will be likely to attain disproportional benefits.48 Thus, while the specification of international preconditions cannot foretell whether statesmen will produce new institutions, it can nevertheless provide information about what kind of behaviour we can expect from the actors involved.
Essential to an institutional approach is the assumption that policy is the product of institutions whose previous historical development can significantly effect the political process in later periods. During transition periods, politics is an 'evolving game of experimentation and adaptation to new historical conditions'. Once institutions are selected, we can begin to see politics in terms of a 'well-ordered game with more or less fixed rules'.49 In Katzenstein's words: 'periods of great crisis can profoundly affect the way domestic politics is organized; periods of relative normality can ... reinforce that pattern of organization .50
Both rational choice and sociological perspectives address the mechanisms of such institutional influence. Rational choice approaches suggest that since institutions will tend to be fairly stable over time, we can focus on the individual responses to incentive structures provided by various institutional designs.51 The approach directs foreign policy analysis towards the strategic use skilful entrepreneurs make of institutional logics. State and societal actors can rely on institutional features in order to advance their preferred national security agendas. But since institutions delineate specific repertoires of policy instruments, they will inevitably preclude some foreign policy options while allowing for others. Additionally, the approach directs foreign-policy analysis towards the way in which given institutional structures and rules provide greater bargaining power to some actors over others. Insofar as various political groups disagree about the appropriate direction of national security and foreign policy, institutions are likely to affect which foreign security agendas rule the day by privileging some groups at the expense of others. In sum, institutions can be considered strategic resources in distributional conflicts precisely because they help some actors prevail over others; institutions matter because they influence the nature of political competition.52 The key is to identify those institutional components which are likely to provide certain groups with increased foreign-policy leverage.
The rational choice approach is criticized by scholars who argue that it neglects the sociological aspects of political interaction. For example, Wendt points out that institutions influence 'not just by creating external constraints on the behavior of exogenously constituted actors', but through the acquiring of 'new understandings of self and other'.53 Institutions persist because they are tied to actors' commitments to their identities. Over time institutional frameworks will cease to be challenged not only because they allow actors to maximize their interests but also because individuals cannot even conceive of appropriate alternatives. As Grafstein comments, 'members work within their institutions and not on them because to step outside the institutional structure is to step into a social void'.54 In short, sociological institutionalism rejects the notion that actors are already equipped with identities and preferences before Both rational choice and sociological perspectives address the mechanisms of such institutional influence. Rational choice approaches suggest that since institutions will tend to be fairly stable over time, we can focus on the individual responses to incentive structures provided by various institutional designs.51 The approach directs foreign policy analysis towards the strategic use skilful entrepreneurs make of institutional logics. State and societal actors can rely on institutional features in order to advance their preferred national security agendas. But since institutions delineate specific repertoires of policy instruments, they will inevitably preclude some foreign policy options while allowing for others. Additionally, the approach directs foreign-policy analysis towards the way in which given institutional structures and rules provide greater bargaining power to some actors over others. Insofar as various political groups disagree about the appropriate direction of national security and foreign policy, institutions are likely to affect which foreign security agendas rule the day by privileging some groups at the expense of others. In sum, institutions can be considered strategic resources in distributional conflicts precisely because they help some actors prevail over others; institutions matter because they influence the nature of political competition.52 The key is to identify those institutional components which are likely to provide certain groups with increased foreign-policy leverage.
The rational choice approach is criticized by scholars who argue that it neglects the sociological aspects of political interaction. For example, Wendt points out that institutions influence 'not just by creating external constraints on the behavior of exogenously constituted actors', but through the acquiring of 'new understandings of self and other'.53 Institutions persist because they are tied to actors' commitments to their identities. Over time institutional frameworks will cease to be challenged not only because they allow actors to maximize their interests but also because individuals cannot even conceive of appropriate alternatives. As Grafstein comments, 'members work within their institutions and not on them because to step outside the institutional structure is to step into a social void'.54 In short, sociological institutionalism rejects the notion that actors are already equipped with identities and preferences before Institutional arguments based on sociological perspectives suggest a competing approach to the study of institutional influence. This approach directs foreign policy analysis towards the ways in which actors invoke institutional rules in order to justify their own foreign-policy choices and delegitimize alternative foreign-policy options. Invoking institutional features is a useful strategy since it involves equating policies with the approval of a desired social order. By proving that certain foreign-policy measures are sanctioned by domestic institutions, these policy options will be accorded a greater degree of legitimacy than would otherwise be the case. Ceteris paribus, actors who succeed in linking foreign-policy options to the legitimacy of the domestic institutional framework will increase their bargaining leverage vis-a-vis competing political groups. The sociological perspective also suggests that foreign-policy strategies may be redefined in order to coincide with preestablished institutional rules and norms. Rather than pursue foreign policies which contradict embedded institutional frameworks, actors will tailor their policy choices to accord with them. Such reconciliation will often require an adjustment or abandonment of certain foreign-policy options.
Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: A Two-Step Institutional Model
The preceding discussion suggests that political behaviour can only be explained in the context of institutionally created incentives and available options. Current foreign-policy preferences and capabilities cannot be understood without looking at prior institutional choices: 'the possible options available at any given point in time are constrained by available institutional capabilities and these capabilities are themselves a product of choices made during some earlier period'.55 I have also suggested that understanding institutional formation and subsequent stability requires that we differentiate between 'politics in crisis' and 'politics in normal times'. Institutions tend to be formed and reformed in periods of acute crisis; they will tend to persist in the absence of such exogenous influences.56 This notion that rapid political change occurs during short-term upheavals followed by longer periods of stability and stasis forms the basis of an institutional approach to foreign policy Institutional arguments based on sociological perspectives suggest a competing approach to the study of institutional influence. This approach directs foreign policy analysis towards the ways in which actors invoke institutional rules in order to justify their own foreign-policy choices and delegitimize alternative foreign-policy options. Invoking institutional features is a useful strategy since it involves equating policies with the approval of a desired social order. By proving that certain foreign-policy measures are sanctioned by domestic institutions, these policy options will be accorded a greater degree of legitimacy than would otherwise be the case. Ceteris paribus, actors who succeed in linking foreign-policy options to the legitimacy of the domestic institutional framework will increase their bargaining leverage vis-a-vis competing political groups. The sociological perspective also suggests that foreign-policy strategies may be redefined in order to coincide with preestablished institutional rules and norms. Rather than pursue foreign policies which contradict embedded institutional frameworks, actors will tailor their policy choices to accord with them. Such reconciliation will often require an adjustment or abandonment of certain foreign-policy options.
The preceding discussion suggests that political behaviour can only be explained in the context of institutionally created incentives and available options. Current foreign-policy preferences and capabilities cannot be understood without looking at prior institutional choices: 'the possible options available at any given point in time are constrained by available institutional capabilities and these capabilities are themselves a product of choices made during some earlier period'.55 I have also suggested that understanding institutional formation and subsequent stability requires that we differentiate between 'politics in crisis' and 'politics in normal times'. Institutions tend to be formed and reformed in periods of acute crisis; they will tend to persist in the absence of such exogenous influences.56 This notion that rapid political change occurs during short-term upheavals followed by longer periods of stability and stasis forms the basis of an institutional approach to foreign policy (see Figure 1 ) Institutional arguments based on sociological perspectives suggest a competing approach to the study of institutional influence. This approach directs foreign policy analysis towards the ways in which actors invoke institutional rules in order to justify their own foreign-policy choices and delegitimize alternative foreign-policy options. Invoking institutional features is a useful strategy since it involves equating policies with the approval of a desired social order. By proving that certain foreign-policy measures are sanctioned by domestic institutions, these policy options will be accorded a greater degree of legitimacy than would otherwise be the case. Ceteris paribus, actors who succeed in linking foreign-policy options to the legitimacy of the domestic institutional framework will increase their bargaining leverage vis-a-vis competing political groups. The sociological perspective also suggests that foreign-policy strategies may be redefined in order to coincide with preestablished institutional rules and norms. Rather than pursue foreign policies which contradict embedded institutional frameworks, actors will tailor their policy choices to accord with them. Such reconciliation will often require an adjustment or abandonment of certain foreign-policy options.
The preceding discussion suggests that political behaviour can only be explained in the context of institutionally created incentives and available options. Current foreign-policy preferences and capabilities cannot be understood without looking at prior institutional choices: 'the possible options available at any given point in time are constrained by available institutional capabilities and these capabilities are themselves a product of choices made during some earlier period'.55 I have also suggested that understanding institutional formation and subsequent stability requires that we differentiate between 'politics in crisis' and 'politics in normal times'. Institutions tend to be formed and reformed in periods of acute crisis; they will tend to persist in the absence of such exogenous influences.56 This notion that rapid political change occurs during short-term upheavals followed by longer periods of stability and stasis forms the basis of an institutional approach to foreign policy (see Figure 1 ) There are several advantages to the proposed institutional perspective. First, it allows for a reciprocal interplay between agency and structure.58 On the one hand, at critical junctures, the activity of political actors can bring about a change in social structure. For instance, while severe international threats are constraints that domestic actors are compelled to deal with, any resulting institutional change depends on how actors perceive they can best cope with these external threats as well as maintain domestic political power. Even when domestic institutions are restructured to changes in the international environment, elites will attempt to retain their positions within the new institutional framework. Consequently, political engineering matters. On the other hand, once formed, social structures constrain agents -even as the latter retain the freedom to manoeuvre within institutional boundaries. The study of political choice remains essential precisely because institutions delimit a range of possible policy options rather than determine any particular path. Indeed, agency matters after institutions are developed and not just in moments of institutional breakdown. Thus, by bracketing time into crisis and non-crisis periods, the approach accounts for both the influence of institutions as well as the purposeful behaviour of political actors. Institutions become both products and constraints.59
Secondly, institutionalism can incorporate both rational choice and sociological perspectives. Both approaches illuminate domestic institutional influences on foreign policy. Institutionalism merely states that actors' choices will be based on a repertoire of pre-existing policy options. It makes no a priori claim as to whether actors will manipulate institutional features in order to achieve their preferred foreign-policy goals or whether they will legitimize these goals by invoking institutional norms -both strategies are potentially feasible.
Lastly, the proposed institutional argument assumes that new institutions may be beneficial or dysfunctional for society as a whole. The irony of institutional choice is that the rules and structures designed to cope with immediate problems may be ineffective for dealing with future challenges. Institutions, and the policies they generate, may end up being suboptimal because new rules and structures tend to express the politics and requirements of the moment. For example, new sets of institutions may initially prove adaptive insofar as they enable actors to deal with immediate foreign policy problems in innovative There are several advantages to the proposed institutional perspective. First, it allows for a reciprocal interplay between agency and structure.58 On the one hand, at critical junctures, the activity of political actors can bring about a change in social structure. For instance, while severe international threats are constraints that domestic actors are compelled to deal with, any resulting institutional change depends on how actors perceive they can best cope with these external threats as well as maintain domestic political power. Even when domestic institutions are restructured to changes in the international environment, elites will attempt to retain their positions within the new institutional framework. Consequently, political engineering matters. On the other hand, once formed, social structures constrain agents -even as the latter retain the freedom to manoeuvre within institutional boundaries. The study of political choice remains essential precisely because institutions delimit a range of possible policy options rather than determine any particular path. Indeed, agency matters after institutions are developed and not just in moments of institutional breakdown. Thus, by bracketing time into crisis and non-crisis periods, the approach accounts for both the influence of institutions as well as the purposeful behaviour of political actors. Institutions become both products and constraints.59
Lastly, the proposed institutional argument assumes that new institutions may be beneficial or dysfunctional for society as a whole. The irony of institutional choice is that the rules and structures designed to cope with immediate problems may be ineffective for dealing with future challenges. Institutions, and the policies they generate, may end up being suboptimal because new rules and structures tend to express the politics and requirements of the moment. For example, new sets of institutions may initially prove adaptive insofar as they enable actors to deal with immediate foreign policy problems in innovative Also absent from the Articles were federal taxation powers. According to the given institutional rules, Congress 'had to rely on the willingness of the individual states to pay assessments levied on them; it had no way to enforce payment'.75 Inevitably, this forced Congress to borrow on foreign credit. By 1786 the United States was unable to pay its interest on these foreign loans and credit was seriously endangered. When Congress attempted to avoid bankruptcy by levying a 5 per cent customs duty, New York's rejection of the scheme guaranteed its failure. Since, under the Articles' rule of unanimity, every state had to agree to the terms of an increase in congressional power, New York's rejection ensured stalemate despite the fact that most states agreed to the measure.76 This lack of an independent source of revenue also exacerbated problems with the British. Without the power to tax, Congress was unable to raise troops. Thus, even if the United States had been able to carry out its treaty obligations, it still would have had little military leverage with which to compel the British to relinquish their Northern garrisons. Also absent from the Articles were federal taxation powers. According to the given institutional rules, Congress 'had to rely on the willingness of the individual states to pay assessments levied on them; it had no way to enforce payment'.75 Inevitably, this forced Congress to borrow on foreign credit. By 1786 the United States was unable to pay its interest on these foreign loans and credit was seriously endangered. When Congress attempted to avoid bankruptcy by levying a 5 per cent customs duty, New York's rejection of the scheme guaranteed its failure. Since, under the Articles' rule of unanimity, every state had to agree to the terms of an increase in congressional power, New York's rejection ensured stalemate despite the fact that most states agreed to the measure.76 This lack of an independent source of revenue also exacerbated problems with the British. Without the power to tax, Congress was unable to raise troops. Thus, even if the United States had been able to carry out its treaty obligations, it still would have had little military leverage with which to compel the British to relinquish their Northern garrisons. Also absent from the Articles were federal taxation powers. According to the given institutional rules, Congress 'had to rely on the willingness of the individual states to pay assessments levied on them; it had no way to enforce payment'.75 Inevitably, this forced Congress to borrow on foreign credit. By 1786 the United States was unable to pay its interest on these foreign loans and credit was seriously endangered. When Congress attempted to avoid bankruptcy by levying a 5 per cent customs duty, New York's rejection of the scheme guaranteed its failure. Since, under the Articles' rule of unanimity, every state had to agree to the terms of an increase in congressional power, New York's rejection ensured stalemate despite the fact that most states agreed to the measure.76 This lack of an independent source of revenue also exacerbated problems with the British. Without the power to tax, Congress was unable to raise troops. Thus, even if the United States had been able to carry out its treaty obligations, it still would have had little military leverage with which to compel the British to relinquish their Northern garrisons. Also absent from the Articles were federal taxation powers. According to the given institutional rules, Congress 'had to rely on the willingness of the individual states to pay assessments levied on them; it had no way to enforce payment'.75 Inevitably, this forced Congress to borrow on foreign credit. By 1786 the United States was unable to pay its interest on these foreign loans and credit was seriously endangered. When Congress attempted to avoid bankruptcy by levying a 5 per cent customs duty, New York's rejection of the scheme guaranteed its failure. Since, under the Articles' rule of unanimity, every state had to agree to the terms of an increase in congressional power, New York's rejection ensured stalemate despite the fact that most states agreed to the measure.76 This lack of an independent source of revenue also exacerbated problems with the British. Without the power to tax, Congress was unable to raise troops. Thus, even if the United States had been able to carry out its treaty obligations, it still would have had little military leverage with which to compel the British to relinquish their Northern garrisons.
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Lack of funds and military power also hindered negotiations with the Indians. As Marks explains: 'Warfare could never be conclusive unless crowned by a treaty. Yet treaties were enormously expensive; they required generous gifts for the Indians, strong military support, and highly paid agents steeped in native customs and language'.77 Without the ability to negotiate with the Indian tribes, a two-front war appeared inevitable. In fact, by 1786 there were large concentrations of Indians on both the southern and northern borders. Both could count on support from British and Spanish outposts. Finally, the inability to effectively raise taxes meant that the United States could not fund a naval squadron capable of patrolling the Mediterranean against the Barbary pirates: plans to form an alliance with the European powers to maintain a permanent naval force that would protect commercial shipping failed to materialize.78
Due to these international threats and poor foreign-policy performance, many Congressmen realized that increased centralization and a stronger national government were required. Indeed, the primary reason for inviting representatives to the Annapolis and Philadelphia conventions was to revise the Articles of Confederation in order to ensure more effective government policies. With the existing government unable to cope with the threat of war, bankruptcy and commercial distress, 'the least that could be done was to establish a strong central government which could have control over all foreign relations'.79
During the constitutional convention and subsequent ratification debate, Federalists in support of a strong central authority had to contend with Anti-Federalists who feared that increased federal powers would override state autonomy and, by extension, individual liberties.80 The Federalists, however, had a bargaining advantage over their opponents. Most agreed that external forces threatened the new republic. Thus, the high stakes and shortness of time increased the bargaining power of the Federalists. Moreover, 'because nearly everyone wanted the government strengthened in the area of foreign affairs, the issue provided the Federalists with the basis for a national consensus and with the primary theme of their campaign'.8'
In particular, the Federalists were able to argue that strengthening the national government vis-a-vis the states would preserve democratic principles as well as Lack of funds and military power also hindered negotiations with the Indians. As Marks explains: 'Warfare could never be conclusive unless crowned by a treaty. Yet treaties were enormously expensive; they required generous gifts for the Indians, strong military support, and highly paid agents steeped in native customs and language'.77 Without the ability to negotiate with the Indian tribes, a two-front war appeared inevitable. In fact, by 1786 there were large concentrations of Indians on both the southern and northern borders. Both could count on support from British and Spanish outposts. Finally, the inability to effectively raise taxes meant that the United States could not fund a naval squadron capable of patrolling the Mediterranean against the Barbary pirates: plans to form an alliance with the European powers to maintain a permanent naval force that would protect commercial shipping failed to materialize.78
In particular, the Federalists were able to argue that strengthening the national government vis-a-vis the states would preserve democratic principles as well as state security.82 According to the Federalists, tyranny would be avoided due to the separation of powers between the branches of the new government and the increased number of interests that would necessarily have to compete against each other in an expanded polity.83 But a larger republic would also ensure the states' security. By authorizing the central government to pool their resources and by limiting the independence and excessive power of the individual states, each state would have greater safety from the European powers than they would acting on their own. Thus, for instance, Roger Sherman insisted that the 'great end' of the new regime was to 'protect the several states' against 'foreign invasion'. Similarly, Oliver Ellsworth and Edmund Randolf argued that the independence of the separate states made them dependent on the foreign powers of Europe and that, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress was unable to 'protect the states'. In sum, 'the Federalists insisted that only a strong union could guarantee the survival of the states. Outside the union, the states would be vulnerable to internal and external assault'.84 Thus, while the Anti-Federalists stressed the adequate provision of one collective good (i.e., democracy), the Federalists were able to show that their institutional alternative would provide for two collective goods (i.e., democracy and security).
Although many of the delegates arriving at Philadelphia were ardent nationalists, the forging of a new institutional framework was not guaranteed. The distinguishing features of the new Constitution and presidential system were accountability and electoral origins. The head of government would be dependent on the electorate and could not be forced to resign by the legislature barring the unusual process of impeachment. The Framers rejected parliamentary features, such as the fusion of executive and legislative powers and the selection of the executive by Congress, because of the perceived effects such measures would have for foreign policy. A parliamentary system would have produced outcomes similar to those under the Articles of Confederation. In a parliamentary system, the legislature, with its local and insular interests, would have continued to dominate foreign policy. It was precisely this kind of parochialism that the Framers wanted to avoid.88 Thus, for example, delegates did not want the executive to be dependent on the legislature with considerable debate revolving around executive election.89 Similarly, in attempting to minimize the influence of popular pressures from the legislature and avoid the chaos which could result from mass politics, the Framers agreed upon a bicameral Congress. In creating the executive and Senate, the Framers sought to insulate foreign-policy making from factional interests. Unlike the unicameral legislature under the Articles, it was assumed that the executive and Senate would be less subject to narrow self-interests and would be less likely to sacrifice the public good. Conducted by a relatively impartial executive and Senate, foreign policy would be more 'rational' and would tend to reflect the general welfare rather than the interests of a few states or regions.9" Due to these new institutional rules, the United States was able to maintain an army and navy which would counteract Indian raids, The timing of the US retaliation against France (why 1798?) and its character (why quasi?) is also illuminated by an institutional approach. In order to understand US military strategy prior to the outbreak of hostilities with France, we must trace the power struggles between the Federalists and the Republicans. Such coalitional analysis, however, will only provide half of the story. The case shows that it is necessary to study coalition-making within the context ofexisting institutions.
Indeed, replacing the Articles of Confederation with a new institutional framework was preceded by a series of bargains between government elites. Most of the delegates wanted to revise provisions in the Articles
First, foreign-policy options were constrained by Constitutional features which required bicameral deliberation on matters of war. Prior to 1798, Federalists held a majority in the Senate but lacked such voting strength in the House. With such a division along party lines, Congress was unable to enact even limited measures for defence -'The Republicans were strong enough in the House to delay action on almost any matter'. Thus, due to the composition of the legislative body, Congressional 'power of the purse', and the Constitutional requirement that both houses vote on matters pertaining to war, 'the nation would have to wait in a state of undeclared, or unofficial, war'.99 However, once the Federalists gained majorities in both houses, they succeeded in voting bill after bill that put the United States on a war footing. In the course of three months, twenty laws for waging the Quasi War were passed.'00 Therefore, the timing of the war appears to have been contingent on Constitutional features and party politics.
Secondly, foreign-policy options were largely a function of the Federalist/ US-French alliance of 1778 and the Constitution stipulated that treaties were the supreme law of the land, Federalists sought to reconcile their policies within Constitutional boundaries by voting a law that formally abrogated all treaties with France. This act was initiated on the premise that, without it, the Federalist programme might appear unconstitutional.97 Yet despite these domestic considerations, the law had international repercussions. It effectively ended the hope of reconciliation with the French. For their part, Republicans invoked the Constitution in attempting to stop approval of Jay's Treaty. Republicans in the House claimed that the concept of separation of powers gave them the right to judge the treaty. Republicans also argued that the Federalist programme was unconstitutional by pointing out that only Congress had the right to declare war and it had never done so against France.98 These examples suggest that the Constitution was already becoming a part of social identity. Both Federalists and Republicans tailored their foreign-policy choices to pre-existing Constitutional features. Domestic actors worked within the limits of given domestic institutions. Foreign policies were pursued only insofar as they conformed to Constitutional rules. The timing of the US retaliation against France (why 1798?) and its character (why quasi?) is also illuminated by an institutional approach. In order to understand US military strategy prior to the outbreak of hostilities with France, we must trace the power struggles between the Federalists and the Republicans. Such coalitional analysis, however, will only provide half of the story. The case shows that it is necessary to study coalition-making within the context ofexisting institutions.
First, foreign-policy options were constrained by Constitutional features which required bicameral deliberation on matters of war. Prior to 1798, Federalists held a majority in the Senate but lacked such voting strength in the House. With such a division along party lines, Congress was unable to enact even limited measures for defence -'The Republicans were strong enough in the House to delay action on almost any matter'. Thus, due to the composition of the legislative body, Congressional 'power of the purse', and the Constitutional requirement that both houses vote on matters pertaining to war, 'the nation would have to wait in a state of undeclared, or unofficial, war'.99 However, once the Federalists gained majorities in both houses, they succeeded in voting bill after bill that put the United States on a war footing. In the course of three months, twenty laws for waging the Quasi War were passed.'00 Therefore, the timing of the war appears to have been contingent on Constitutional features and party politics. Foreign-policy options considered after the conflict with Mexico had begun can also be considered a function of domestic politics rather than external exigencies. As in the cases of the Quasi War and the War of 1812, coalitional analysis is crucial to explaining which of these foreign-policy options was chosen. But such a 'society-centred' approach must also take account of the constraints and resources provided by pre-existing institutions.
Conservative Whigs (i.e., Cotton Whigs) sought to preserve party unity by proposing that no Mexican territory should be taken. This strategy was meant to stem the increasing division within the Whig party over the slavery issue. With pro-and anti-slavery coalitions beginning to emerge within the party, the strategy presented an alternative upon which both Northern and Southern Whigs could safely unite. Thus, this 'No Territory' policy was primarily a political strategy designed to protect the Whig party rather than a means of ending the war.'29 Given their numerical disadvantage in Congress, however, this Whig strategy was bound to be rejected -the expansionist Democratic majority would not accept such a self-defeating restriction. Whig radicals (i.e., the Conscience Whigs) offered a competing foreign-policy strategy, one which was also tied to domestic considerations. For these opposition Congressmen, the annexation of Texas along with the Mexican War represented a scheme of the slave states to extend their territory and hence increase their voting power in Congress. Consequently, Conscience Whigs argued that pro-annexation forces should be expressly prohibited from admitting the new territory gained from Mexico as slave states. Since Congressional passage of such an act would automatically ensure that any Mexican territory acquired in the war would be free territory, radical Whigs reasoned that Polk and his pro-slavery supporters would lose their incentive for fighting the Mexicans. 30 Thus radical Whigs were just as concerned about domestic political power as the conservative wing of the party. Both sought foreign-policy strategies that would enhance the political power of the Whig party and the free states.
Polk Foreign-policy options considered after the conflict with Mexico had begun can also be considered a function of domestic politics rather than external exigencies. As in the cases of the Quasi War and the War of 1812, coalitional analysis is crucial to explaining which of these foreign-policy options was chosen. But such a 'society-centred' approach must also take account of the constraints and resources provided by pre-existing institutions.
Polk what appeared to be the impending annexation of all of Mexico, a policy which would have been rational given external opportunities, has its roots in domestic politics. In fact, the 'all Mexico' coalition was blocked due to an unlikely coalition between anti-slavery Whigs and pro-slavery Democrats.'13 As previously mentioned, Northern Whigs feared that the whole of Mexico, if annexed, would become slave territory. But, by 1848, Southern Democrats were convinced that slavery could not be extended beyond Texas or below the Rio Grande. It was thought that slavery would not flourish in the vast portion of Mexican land due to the lack of cultivable soil. Since Mexican territory would thus become free territory, its annexation would weaken Southern bargaining power.'32 Thus anti-and pro-slavery groups found themselves strange bedfellows with regard to foreign-policy options -a continuation of the war to subjugate all of Mexico would be politically devastating to their respective sectional interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has used US state building and subsequent military strategy from 1781 to 1848 as a benchmark against which to challenge the theoretical primacy granted to neorealism in the study of small state behaviour. I have argued that while neorealism provides a persuasive explanation for domestic institutional choices in the new American republic, it proves less useful in accounting for US foreign security policies in later periods.
This finding should come as some surprise to both Comparativists and IR scholars. Comparativists have assumed that internal political processes determine democratic institutional development in newly independent states. By contrast, in IR there is a long tradition which suggests that external factors are more likely to influence the foreign policies of these weak states. This article has suggested that there is little reason to accept the validity of such traditional claims about the domains within which domestic and international variables will be valid. Paradoxically, international and domestic factors will often influence state practice when we least expect it. ' By December 1847, US forces had occupied Mexico City and were in control of Mexican seaports as well as all of her northern provinces. The prevention of what appeared to be the impending annexation of all of Mexico, a policy which would have been rational given external opportunities, has its roots in domestic politics. In fact, the 'all Mexico' coalition was blocked due to an unlikely coalition between anti-slavery Whigs and pro-slavery Democrats.'13 As previously mentioned, Northern Whigs feared that the whole of Mexico, if annexed, would become slave territory. But, by 1848, Southern Democrats were convinced that slavery could not be extended beyond Texas or below the Rio Grande. It was thought that slavery would not flourish in the vast portion of Mexican land due to the lack of cultivable soil. Since Mexican territory would thus become free territory, its annexation would weaken Southern bargaining power.'32 Thus anti-and pro-slavery groups found themselves strange bedfellows with regard to foreign-policy options -a continuation of the war to subjugate all of Mexico would be politically devastating to their respective sectional interests.
This finding should come as some surprise to both Comparativists and IR scholars. Comparativists have assumed that internal political processes determine democratic institutional development in newly independent states. By contrast, in IR there is a long tradition which suggests that external factors are more likely to influence the foreign policies of these weak states. This article has suggested that there is little reason to accept the validity of such traditional claims about the domains within which domestic and international variables will be valid. Paradoxically, international and domestic factors will often influence state practice when we least expect it. ' That foreign-policy making is susceptible to domestic political constraints has become almost a truism among IR theorists. Indeed, few would disagree that, among the great powers, domestic politics can generate national security policies which fail to correspond to systemic/structural imperatives. On the one hand, domestic politics may prevent policy responses which are dictated by the 'balance of power' and the 'balance of threat'. Alternatively, domestic politics may produce military strategies which should be precluded by these international exigencies.133 But finding that domestic groups and constitutional arrangements play an important role in great power foreign-policy making should hardly be surprising. Since great powers are less constrained by the international environment, we would expect domestic political processes to matter. Small state foreign policy rather than great power behaviour necessarily constitutes a more demanding test for domestic level theories.
Contrary to received wisdom, this article has shown that small state behaviour is not immune from domestic political influences. It may well be that small state foreign security policy can be viewed as a state-centric phenomenon in which military strategy is a response to international pressures. But this is a proposition to be tested empirically rather than one to be assumed a priori. Contrary to the state-centric approach, the cases I have examined reveal that even the most vulnerable states may display foreign policies explicable only in terms of domestic politics. This is especially true for weak states which are also domestically liberal. Various institutional designs for representative democracies are likely to condition the foreign policies of all democratic states, whether they are great powers or small states. In sum, the historical evidence presented here suggests that the causal primacy granted to international explanations of small state behaviour is unwarranted. The influence of particular domestic institutional constraints on foreign policy deserves more attention than it currently receives from small state researchers.
Although most IR theorists would concede that a state's foreign policy is to some degree an extension of its internal situation, even the staunchest supporters of domestic level theorizing have argued that domestic politics is less likely to matter when foreign threats appear great. It is assumed that domestic level theory will be less useful in explaining decisions to go to war because the high stakes require a vigilant attention to national security interests and international circumstances. For example, Posen claims that when external threat is low, great power military doctrines will be shaped by domestic organizational biases, while in periods of high external threat these doctrines will conform to international exigencies. That foreign-policy making is susceptible to domestic political constraints has become almost a truism among IR theorists. Indeed, few would disagree that, among the great powers, domestic politics can generate national security policies which fail to correspond to systemic/structural imperatives. On the one hand, domestic politics may prevent policy responses which are dictated by the 'balance of power' and the 'balance of threat'. Alternatively, domestic politics may produce military strategies which should be precluded by these international exigencies.133 But finding that domestic groups and constitutional arrangements play an important role in great power foreign-policy making should hardly be surprising. Since great powers are less constrained by the international environment, we would expect domestic political processes to matter. Small state foreign policy rather than great power behaviour necessarily constitutes a more demanding test for domestic level theories.
Although most IR theorists would concede that a state's foreign policy is to some degree an extension of its internal situation, even the staunchest supporters of domestic level theorizing have argued that domestic politics is less likely to matter when foreign threats appear great. It is assumed that domestic level theory will be less useful in explaining decisions to go to war because the high stakes require a vigilant attention to national security interests and international circumstances. For example, Posen claims that when external threat is low, great power military doctrines will be shaped by domestic organizational biases, while in periods of high external threat these doctrines will conform to international exigencies.134 Contrary to Posen, I have argued that domestic political constraints do not drop out of the foreign-policy equation merely because war seems more probable. Since domestic level arguments can explain small state decisions to go to war, then we have reason to support such theories That foreign-policy making is susceptible to domestic political constraints has become almost a truism among IR theorists. Indeed, few would disagree that, among the great powers, domestic politics can generate national security policies which fail to correspond to systemic/structural imperatives. On the one hand, domestic politics may prevent policy responses which are dictated by the 'balance of power' and the 'balance of threat'. Alternatively, domestic politics may produce military strategies which should be precluded by these international exigencies.133 But finding that domestic groups and constitutional arrangements play an important role in great power foreign-policy making should hardly be surprising. Since great powers are less constrained by the international environment, we would expect domestic political processes to matter. Small state foreign policy rather than great power behaviour necessarily constitutes a more demanding test for domestic level theories.
Although most IR theorists would concede that a state's foreign policy is to some degree an extension of its internal situation, even the staunchest supporters of domestic level theorizing have argued that domestic politics is less likely to matter when foreign threats appear great. It is assumed that domestic level theory will be less useful in explaining decisions to go to war because the high stakes require a vigilant attention to national security interests and international circumstances. For example, Posen claims that when external threat is low, great power military doctrines will be shaped by domestic organizational biases, while in periods of high external threat these doctrines will conform to international exigencies. with greater confidence when considering the more obvious cases of great power military strategy, even when external threats are extreme. All this is not to say that neorealists should pack their theoretical tents and steal away into the night.135 Rather than reject neorealism completely, we should distinguish the conditions under which it has value from those situations where it is likely to be less relevant. The aim of such research would not be a refutation of neorealism, but rather a clearer understanding of the domains within which domestic and international explanations are likely to prove superior and a more precise sense of the relative importance of external and internal constraints. with greater confidence when considering the more obvious cases of great power military strategy, even when external threats are extreme.
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All this is not to say that neorealists should pack their theoretical tents and steal away into the night.135 Rather than reject neorealism completely, we should distinguish the conditions under which it has value from those situations where it is likely to be less relevant. The aim of such research would not be a refutation of neorealism, but rather a clearer understanding of the domains within which domestic and international explanations are likely to prove superior and a more precise sense of the relative importance of external and internal constraints. 'incoherent' foreign policy. Specifically, a democratic system based on the principle of electorally separated branches with shared powers hinders governmental consensus and, therefore, increases the likelihood that foreignpolicy behaviour will be disconnected from international circumstances to which, in principle, it should be responsive.'38 The review of pre-1900 US foreign policy presented here lends support for this claim. US foreign policy throughout this period failed to correspond to international conditions. Partisan politics and domestic institutional features decreased the likelihood of conducting effective national security policies. Since the United States often failed to respond rationally to international circumstances, this article corroborates the classic notion that there is a trade-off between democratic institutions and the effectiveness of foreign policy. More research is required on foreign-policy making within internationally weak, domestically liberal states in order to fully assess whether democratic ideals are compatible with the realities of international politics.
A second avenue for new research on small states might address the debate about presidential versus parliamentary government. '9 The central claim of this literature is that the balance of power between the executive and legislature in decision making varies greatly from one democratic country to the next and that these differences matter. For example, presidentialism is said to have the disadvantage of less democracy (i.e., representation) but the advantage of government stability, while parliamentarism is said to have the opposite consequences of greater democracy and instability. However, the direct effects of presidential and parliamentary systems on foreign-policy outcomes have been less studied.
In terms of presidential government, the cases I have examined highlight three disadvantages for foreign policy: (1) executive-legislative deadlock; (2) temporal rigidity; and (3) legislative parochialism. In presidential systems, conflict between the two branches of government tends to increase because each is an independently elected organ and lacks any institutional method for resolving disagreement: 'the inability of the assembly to remove the executive and of the executive to remove the assembly prevents either branch from resolving political crises based on fundamental mutual opposition'.140 Furthermore, because both branches are popularly elected and the tenure of each is unaffected by relations with the other, the need for co-operation between the president and congress is less urgent. Neither the president nor legislators have 'incoherent' foreign policy. Specifically, a democratic system based on the principle of electorally separated branches with shared powers hinders governmental consensus and, therefore, increases the likelihood that foreignpolicy behaviour will be disconnected from international circumstances to which, in principle, it should be responsive.'38 The review of pre-1900 US foreign policy presented here lends support for this claim. US foreign policy throughout this period failed to correspond to international conditions. Partisan politics and domestic institutional features decreased the likelihood of conducting effective national security policies. Since the United States often failed to respond rationally to international circumstances, this article corroborates the classic notion that there is a trade-off between democratic institutions and the effectiveness of foreign policy. More research is required on foreign-policy making within internationally weak, domestically liberal states in order to fully assess whether democratic ideals are compatible with the realities of international politics.
In terms of presidential government, the cases I have examined highlight three disadvantages for foreign policy: (1) executive-legislative deadlock; (2) temporal rigidity; and (3) legislative parochialism. In presidential systems, conflict between the two branches of government tends to increase because each is an independently elected organ and lacks any institutional method for resolving disagreement: 'the inability of the assembly to remove the executive and of the executive to remove the assembly prevents either branch from resolving political crises based on fundamental mutual opposition'.140 Furthermore, because both branches are popularly elected and the tenure of each is unaffected by relations with the other, the need for co-operation between the president and congress is less urgent. Finally, because presidential systems separate the electoral origins of the executive and legislative branches, foreign policy is likely to reflect parochial and particularistic interests. Since congressmen need not tie their chances for re-election to a national policy position, they can spend a great deal of time 'courting personal followings in their own district'.145 Since presidential democracies encourage legislative participation in policy making so as to provide effective checks and balances on executive action, foreign policy is likely to reflect the partisan and local interests that dominate congressional attention; narrow ideological and local interests will often influence foreignpolicy choices and take precedence over the demands of national security. This was especially the case with regard to military strategy prior to the War of 1812. Despite the more moderate stance of the executive, a majority of Congress favoured war with Britain in order to advance their particular sectional interests. In this case, logrolling in Congress determined the course of US security policy.
The preceding comments underscore the irony of domestic institutional choice -while decision makers may initially adopt presidentialism in order to solve the foreign-policy problems of the moment, this institutional design is likely to generate long-term problems for foreign policy which its designers neither intended nor anticipated. I have argued that advocates of democratization will often have strong incentives to choose presidential systems precisely because present foreign-policy performance will be weighted heavily in the decision-making calculus. Indeed, the fact that many newly independent states decide in favour of presidential government casts doubt on a growing scholarly consensus that parliamentarism is best. According to current wisdom, countries removing the president. In a parliamentary system, legislators would have been able to call for a vote of confidence. In such a circumstance, it is unlikely that Polk would have received the necessary majority in Congress to remain in office. Had Congress been able to secure a new executive more in tune with shifting congressional majorities, it is likely that the course of the war would have proceeded quite differently. Moreover, the fact that the executive and legislature have separate electoral origins means that the foreign policies of presidential democracies are likely to be inflexible.'44 Early American foreign policy lends support to this hypothesis. New foreign policies tended to coincide with electoral turnovers which altered the distribution of power within Congress. For example, the timing and direction of the Quasi War was affected by 'critical elections' which changed the voting power of the Federalists vis-a-vis the Republicans. It was only after the Federalists gained a majority in Congress that they were able to alter the war's scope.
Finally, because presidential systems separate the electoral origins of the executive and legislative branches, foreign policy is likely to reflect parochial and particularistic interests. Since congressmen need not tie their chances for re-election to a national policy position, they can spend a great deal of time 'courting personal followings in their own district'.145 Since presidential democracies encourage legislative participation in policy making so as to provide effective checks and balances on executive action, foreign policy is likely to reflect the partisan and local interests that dominate congressional attention; narrow ideological and local interests will often influence foreignpolicy choices and take precedence over the demands of national security. This was especially the case with regard to military strategy prior to the War of 1812. Despite the more moderate stance of the executive, a majority of Congress favoured war with Britain in order to advance their particular sectional interests. In this case, logrolling in Congress determined the course of US security policy.
The preceding comments underscore the irony of domestic institutional choice -while decision makers may initially adopt presidentialism in order to solve the foreign-policy problems of the moment, this institutional design is likely to generate long-term problems for foreign policy which its designers neither intended nor anticipated. I have argued that advocates of democratization will often have strong incentives to choose presidential systems precisely because present foreign-policy performance will be weighted heavily in the decision-making calculus. Indeed, the fact that many newly independent states decide in favour of presidential government casts doubt on a growing scholarly consensus that parliamentarism is best. According to current wisdom, countries opting for democracy should reject presidentialism because its zero sum and 'winner take all' character heightens the dissatisfaction of losing groups and, by extension, increases the likelihood of domestic conflict.146 But, as this article has demonstrated, when the leaders of newly independent states choose between democratic alternatives, they will not merely be interested in their domestic consequences. If an emerging state is faced with external threats, statesmen cannot afford to concentrate only on long-term domestic stability -they must also consider short-term foreign-policy performance. In terms of increasing immediate foreign-policy options, presidential democracy may appear as a more attractive option than parliamentary alternatives.
A comparison between US democratization and the more recent democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe underscores this international-national connection. In the US case, international threats were coupled with poor foreign-policy performance under a decentralized democratic system. As a result, the Framers of the US Constitution tried to design a new democratic government which would minimize the impact of parochial interests on foreign policy and were predisposed to a system which would maximize executive autonomy. Because international circumstances threatened national survival, an executive less likely to be buffeted by societal whims became all the more necessary. Thus presidentialism was an attempt to adapt domestic circumstances to a rapidly deteriorating external environment. By contrast, a number of East European countries have opted for parliamentary institutional designs.'47 To be sure, parliamentarism has been defended there because of its perceived capacity for ensuring that the interests of both government and opposition are represented in the new system. Yet, had the international environment been more threatening, reformers would have had to weigh these domestic advantages against the likely consequences of parliamentarism for foreign policy. With the external threat of Soviet intervention removed, East European reformers did not have to worry about creating a strong executive capable of decisive and independent action in foreign affairs. They needed to be less concerned about whether a powerful legislature would be likely to bloc foreign-policy action for local and particularistic goals. Indeed, contrary to the experience of the Framers of the US Constitution, East European reformers had many more choices. Adopting parliamentarism posed far less of a risk in Eastern Europe than it did for the early American republic. Increased centralization and a strengthening of the executive branch of the state vis-a-vis society was an option rather than an imperative. opting for democracy should reject presidentialism because its zero sum and 'winner take all' character heightens the dissatisfaction of losing groups and, by extension, increases the likelihood of domestic conflict.146 But, as this article has demonstrated, when the leaders of newly independent states choose between democratic alternatives, they will not merely be interested in their domestic consequences. If an emerging state is faced with external threats, statesmen cannot afford to concentrate only on long-term domestic stability -they must also consider short-term foreign-policy performance. In terms of increasing immediate foreign-policy options, presidential democracy may appear as a more attractive option than parliamentary alternatives.
A comparison between US democratization and the more recent democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe underscores this international-national connection. In the US case, international threats were coupled with poor foreign-policy performance under a decentralized democratic system. As a result, the Framers of the US Constitution tried to design a new democratic government which would minimize the impact of parochial interests on foreign policy and were predisposed to a system which would maximize executive autonomy. Because international circumstances threatened national survival, an executive less likely to be buffeted by societal whims became all the more necessary. Thus presidentialism was an attempt to adapt domestic circumstances to a rapidly deteriorating external environment. By contrast, a number of East European countries have opted for parliamentary institutional designs.'47 To be sure, parliamentarism has been defended there because of its perceived capacity for ensuring that the interests of both government and opposition are represented in the new system. Yet, had the international environment been more threatening, reformers would have had to weigh these domestic advantages against the likely consequences of parliamentarism for foreign policy. With the external threat of Soviet intervention removed, East European reformers did not have to worry about creating a strong executive capable of decisive and independent action in foreign affairs. They needed to be less concerned about whether a powerful legislature would be likely to bloc foreign-policy action for local and particularistic goals. Indeed, contrary to the experience of the Framers of the US Constitution, East European reformers had many more choices. Adopting parliamentarism posed far less of a risk in Eastern Europe than it did for the early American republic. Increased centralization and a strengthening of the executive branch of the state vis-a-vis society was an option rather than an imperative. In sum, any generalized claim for the causal priority of international or domestic explanations of small state behaviour is unwarranted. Both levels of analysis matter because while the international environment influences domestic political choices, these institutional decisions shape foreign policies in later periods. In emerging states, domestic institutional development may often be a reaction to external circumstances, but there is no guarantee that ensuing foreign-policy strategies will reflect these international exigencies. The recent democratization of Eastern Europe presents a golden opportunity for studying these issues. Since these events have provided a set of new cases of small states which have also opted for particular democratic governments, they can supply additional empirical evidence about how current constitutional experiments might influence subsequent small state foreign policy. As newly independent states increasingly turn towards democracy, we should benefit from this careful and systematic study of domestic politics in general and alternative political systems in particular.
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